

~~SECRET~~

OXO 68-0243

3 May 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Warsaw Pact

1. There are no known classified implementing agreements or secret codicils other than those referred to in the attached study* on pages 7 and 8. It can be surmised, however, that just as in NATO, there must be agreements controlling and describing the training, equipment, disposition and use of the various national military units assigned to the Warsaw Pact command. We believe that the Pact countries must also have arrangements for sharing intelligence information on NATO forces.

2. We do not know the exact units designated, but we have gained some idea from talking with [redacted] and from analyzing the joint maneuvers held each fall by the Warsaw Pact forces.

3. Poland and Czechoslovakia, we believe, would in the event of a war each have its own front in Warsaw Pact operations in Central Europe. Each probably would commit 3 ground armies and 1 air army plus supporting units such as missile brigades.

4. As for Hungary, which has 4 occupying Soviet Divisions, and Bulgaria we don't really know but it seems likely that they too each have a specific role to

*The Warsaw Pact, a study by the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, May 1966. See pages 19-23 for text of the Warsaw Pact, the provisions of which have not been changed to our knowledge.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000200040030-9

play in the larger Warsaw Pact picture. Albania is a non-active, non-participating member and Rumania probably could not be counted on to defend more than its own territory.

5. As to the question of the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact, this has been a matter of dispute among some of the members. For several years Rumania, with no success, has been insisting that the position of Commander-in-Chief should be rotated among each of the member countries. Czechoslovakia, more recently, is thought to have been calling for a greater role for East European countries in the Pact's Joint Armed Forces Command. Some of our reports indicate this may have been the source of considerable disagreement at the recent meeting in Dresden of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries.

6. So far the Russians have stood firm and been unwilling, as might be expected, to agree to any such idea. Despite the presence of a command staff in Moscow composed of military representatives from Eastern Europe, the Soviet General Staff does all the Warsaw Pact planning. For obvious reasons, therefore, they would be most reluctant to rotate the position of Commander-in-Chief, though they may soon come out with some type of symbolic change responsive to the pressures from Eastern Europe.

Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000200040030-9

SECRET

89th Congress }
2d Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

THE WARSAW PACT
ITS ROLE IN SOVIET BLOC AFFAIRS

A STUDY

SUBMITTED BY THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

(Pursuant to S. Res. 181, 89th Cong.)

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

62-884

WASHINGTON : 1966

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas, *Chairman*

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota

SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina

CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska

ERNEST GRUENING, Alaska

JACOB K. JAVITS, New York

EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine

MILWARD L. SIMPSON, Wyoming

ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut

FRED R. HARRIS, Oklahoma

ROBERT F. KENNEDY, New York

LEE METCALF, Montana

JOSEPH M. MONTGOMERY, New Mexico

JAMES R. CALLOWAY, *Chief Clerk and Staff Director*

ARTHUR A. SHARP, *Staff Editor*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington, *Chairman*

EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota

ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut

JACOB K. JAVITS, New York

FRED R. HARRIS, Oklahoma

MILWARD L. SIMPSON, Wyoming

ROBERT F. KENNEDY, New York

LEE METCALF, Montana

DOROTHY FOSDICK, *Staff Director*

ROBERT W. TUFTS, *Chief Consultant*

CEDRIC W. TARR, Jr., *Professional Staff Member*

JUDITH J. SPAHR, *Chief Clerk*

WILLIAM O. FARBER, *Minority Consultant*

FOREWORD

Authorized by resolution of the Senate, the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations is reviewing the conduct of national security policy, with special reference to alliance operations and the Atlantic Alliance.

In its inquiry, the subcommittee thought it would be helpful to look closely at the Warsaw Pact. The subcommittee staff, in cooperation with the executive branch, was asked to arrange for the preparation of the present study on the role of the Warsaw Pact in Soviet bloc affairs from the origin of the Pact in 1955. Included in this study is a comparison of the Warsaw Pact Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty.

We believe that this publication will contribute to greater understanding of developments in the Soviet bloc, and will be of special interest to officials of the government and to private citizens concerned with problems of the Atlantic Alliance.

HENRY M. JACKSON,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security
and International Operations.*

MAY 11, 1966.

III

CONTENTS

Foreword.....	Page III
THE WARSAW PACT	
Summary.....	1
History of the Organization.....	1
The Warsaw Pact Today and Its Value to the USSR.....	9
Benefits Derived by Eastern Europe from the Pact.....	14
Problems Within the Pact.....	15
Charts	
Bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Signed By Warsaw Pact Members.....	7
Warsaw Pact Structure.....	9
Estimated Personnel Strength of the Eastern European Armed Forces...	13
Appendices	
A. Text of Warsaw Pact Agreement.....	19
B. Comparison of Warsaw Pact Treaty and North Atlantic Treaty.....	24
C. Military Expenditures in the Eastern European Communist Countries..	31
D. Warsaw Pact Meetings Since May 1955.....	32

THE WARSAW PACT

ITS ROLE IN SOVIET BLOC AFFAIRS

SUMMARY

The Warsaw Pact was created in May 1955 by the USSR as a political response to West Germany's rearmament and admission to NATO.

The establishment of the pact was in part an outgrowth of the desire of Russia's post-Stalin leadership to replace the methods of Stalin, which were no longer practicable, with a new mechanism for maintaining its position as the supreme arbiter of Soviet bloc affairs. The Warsaw Pact provided a new basis for the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of some of the Eastern European countries.

The Russians probably thought—although they were later proven to be wrong—that the pact was also a form of insurance against effective political initiatives by the leaders of the East European Communist parties. The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact was designed as a convenient sounding board for Soviet foreign policy views, particularly about West Germany and its admission on 9 May 1955 to NATO.

At the outset, the Eastern European members gained some limited military benefits from their membership in the Warsaw Pact, but they had no opportunity to function as other than the military and political vassals of Moscow. This is no longer the case, however, because of political evolution within the Soviet bloc and of changes in the relations of the Soviet bloc states to each other. The effect has been to give the Warsaw Pact a political role in Soviet bloc affairs at least as important as its function of bringing about military integration.

Today, it is no exaggeration to say that the Warsaw Pact is one of the few remaining effective devices available to Moscow for holding the Soviet bloc together at a time when the forces of national self-interest are increasingly coming into play in Eastern Europe. The Eastern European states, for their part, probably regard the pact as surety that the USSR will continue to underwrite their regimes and to safeguard their boundaries.

The USSR, in response to this view and to protect its own interests, has had to tolerate the gradual achievement of some measure of equality among pact members. Meaningful military coordination among the armies of the signatories has advanced, so that the Eastern European armed forces are a more useful adjunct to Soviet military power.

HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION

WHY IT WAS ESTABLISHED

The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), established formally on 14 May 1955, is composed of eight European Communist states—the

USSR, Albania,¹ Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. In the past Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia, all of which remain outside the formal structure of the treaty, have attended pact meetings as observers. Thus the WTO, which has both a military and a political character, is primarily a European organization (see appendix A, p. 19, for text of Warsaw Pact). Its specific purpose was to serve as a counter to NATO, and internally as the formal device for the perpetuation of close ties between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European regimes.

DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

The act of forming the Warsaw Pact climaxed a series of unsuccessful attempts by the USSR to prevent the inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Western alliance, NATO. At the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers in February 1954, Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov renewed earlier Soviet suggestions for the neutralization of Germany and proposed an all-European treaty of collective security. By the terms of the Soviet proposal, cooperation among treaty signatories would be confined to the military field, and agreements on mutual aid among participants would be determined by special procedures to be worked out later. Like the North Atlantic Treaty, the proposal specified that armed aggression against one treaty partner was to be considered an attack on all. Initially the United States and the Chinese People's Republic were to be accorded only observer status in the treaty organs, but the following month the USSR indicated its willingness to accept the U.S. in the all-European security pact and at the same time suggested its own entrance into NATO.

Although the Soviet proposals were unacceptable to the Western powers, the USSR renewed its efforts to undermine the European Defense Community and in July 1954 suggested the holding of an all-European collective security conference. The invitation was rejected by the Western powers. Some months later, in December 1954, the USSR convened a meeting in Moscow of its Eastern European allies. The Chinese People's Republic was invited to send an observer, and did so. After the Moscow gathering it was announced that the bloc would "take common measures for the organization of armed forces and their commands" in the event that the Western powers ratified the agreement signed in Paris on 23 October 1954, permitting the rearming of West Germany and its subsequent admission to NATO and the Western European Union.

When the Paris Agreements went into effect on 5 May 1955, the USSR carried out its threat and annulled its treaties of alliance with Great Britain (1942) and France (1944). The entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO occurred on 9 May 1955. Two days later the "Conference of European Countries for the Protection of Peace and the Security of Europe" began in Warsaw. On 14 May the Treaty for Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation was signed, and the eight countries party to the treaty issued a "Resolution on the Formation of a Unified Command of Armed Forces."

¹ Although still nominally a member of the Warsaw Pact, Albania apparently no longer takes part in pact activities. It rejected a pact invitation to send Albanian representatives to the last Political Consultative Committee meeting known to have been held, that of January 1965. Moreover, because of its diplomatic break with Moscow in 1961, it is unlikely that Albania has had any formal type of military relationship with the Soviet bloc for at least the last five years.

The establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization thus coincided in time with the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to membership in the Western alliance.² Pact signatories explained its creation primarily as an answer to the expansion of NATO and the creation of the Western European Union. Conversely, observers in the West initially tended to view the provisions of the Warsaw Pact primarily as an effort to hasten the military integration of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European neighbors and to justify the maintenance of Soviet troops in those countries.

THE SITUATION IN THE SOVIET BLOC

The death of Stalin and the resultant political uncertainty that beset the Communist leaderships in Eastern Europe were also among the key factors which made a formal arrangement governing military and political matters within the Soviet bloc desirable in the eyes of the new Soviet leadership. Already there had been manifestations of popular discontent in Berlin and in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, in addition to economic problems and the appearance of factional dissent within some local Communist parties.

The two years from Stalin's death in 1953 to the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 were marked by the attempts of Georgi A. Malenkov, Molotov, and Nikita S. Khrushchev to consolidate their individual power bases. Soviet political and economic problems demanded immediate answers, and these problems became the issues over which the internecine struggle was waged within the "collective leadership."

Malenkov, whose "new course" proposed to cure Soviet economic ills without disrupting the Stalinist political structure, tended to ignore the effect of such a program on the stability of the Eastern European regimes, then floundering under the legacy of Stalin's economic structures. Moreover, the Eastern Europeans at this point erroneously interpreted Malenkov's denigration of Stalinist economics as meaning that there would be a concomitant loosening of Stalinist political controls. Malenkov also overlooked the fact that a softer foreign policy line might undermine stable intra-bloc relations.

Molotov, the die-hard Stalinist, doggedly persisted in his espousal of the hard line in both the economic sector, where he was unwilling to abandon Stalin's emphasis on heavy industry, and the international arena, where he opposed rapprochement with Yugoslavia and a soft-pedaling of East-West antagonisms.

Khrushchev alone attempted a fusion of past with present on both the domestic and intra-party front, pursuing a course that sought improvement of the agricultural situation, revitalization of the economy and betterment of the standard of living without abandoning past Soviet commitments to the prior development of heavy industry.

Under Stalin's rule, the Eastern European party hierarchies had become accustomed to receiving instructions from their Soviet advisors, and they followed uncritically the line developed by Moscow. They reacted with considerable disorientation to the absence of clearly defined economic and political formulas. The Eastern European regimes were also uneasy because of popular pressures to take initiatives for economic and political reform on the home front.

² See appendix B, p. 24, for a comparison of the terms of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

THE WARSAW PACT

Popular resentment of terrorism, economic stagnation and party incompetence were becoming increasingly widespread in Eastern Europe.

In East Germany, the Party had already been shaken by the workers' riots and general strike of June 1953, which had been quelled only by Soviet troops. Although the Socialist Unity Party (SED) rejected general criticism of the Party line at its 15th Central Committee Plenum that July, it did admit that an accelerated effort "to construct the socialist foundation had erred in ignoring practical internal and external considerations." Economic concessions were made, including a reduction in wage taxes and prices, and a partial amnesty was granted for those convicted of minor offenses.

A similar state of affairs existed in Czechoslovakia, where citizens rioted in Pilsen in the summer of 1953 to protest a regime-inspired currency reform. Subsequent party appeasement gestures included a reduction in delivery quotas and a slowdown in the rate of industrial production, as well as a limited and short-lived "de-collectivization" program.

In Poland, widespread poverty, economic instability and a restive populace added to the problems facing the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR). The PZPR was hampered in attempting a relatively calm transition to reform programs by the presence of the imprisoned but not forgotten former Party boss, Wladyslaw Gomulka, whose rehabilitation many party members thought should logically follow regime espousal of economic change and limited liberalization. In fact, his release in April 1955, after incarceration since 1949 for "revisionist tendencies" and "Titoism," and a reorganization within the Ministry of Public Security preceded the Polish Communist leadership's endorsement of a less rigid domestic policy.

In Hungary, the cumulative effect of the violent purge trials, the executions of non-Communist leaders and an extremely intensive industrialization drive necessitated the elevation of the "liberal" Imre Nagy to the Premiership. A subsequent government call for a "consolidation of legality" attempted to head off popular reaction to economic and personal repression.

In Rumania, rejection of the SOVROM—joint stock companies that facilitated Soviet exploitation of the country's resources—as well as the 1952 ouster of pro-Moscow Rumanian party leaders like hardline Vice Premier Anna Pauker, were further indications that a lack of firm leadership on the part of the USSR was leading to a corresponding lack of political cohesion in the bloc.

In an effort to buttress the individual regimes and to reverse the trend toward bloc disunity, Khrushchev began to emphasize the position of the Eastern European countries as equal partners with the Soviet Union. He hoped thereby to set the stage to bind them in a political and military alliance that would create a commonwealth of socialist states and ensure continued Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET CONTROL OVER EASTERN EUROPE

As an instrument of Soviet control, the Warsaw Pact had value as a device for monitoring political and military developments in the member states. In the political field, it reminded the signatories of

their common ideologies and purpose, underscored the importance of formal inter-state ties and created a mechanism providing a common political forum, over which the Soviet Union at first exercised complete control. In its military aspect, it would eventually lead to the solution of such problems as the status of Soviet troops in the bloc countries, and the consolidation of the Eastern European armies as an effective front line of defense for the Soviet Union.

INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL PROPAGANDA

Soviet Marshal G. P. Zhukov, in an article entitled "The Warsaw Pact and Questions of International Security," published in Moscow in 1961, observed,

The Warsaw Pact appeared and exists as a defense pact of governments that are threatened by a common danger. This is confirmed, if only by the fact that the Warsaw treaty was born six years after the North Atlantic bloc in answer to their forming of a military threat.

This theme has been used frequently by the USSR to underscore the allegedly defensive character of the bloc alliance, and to establish the alleged intransigence of the Western powers. Related propaganda has also directed considerable attention to the provision for dissolution of the Warsaw Pact the minute that NATO ceases to exist.

According to Zhukov,

the Paris Agreements formed a wide possibility for the rebirth of militarism in West Germany. The coming into force of the Paris Agreements compelled them (the Warsaw Pact states) to take appropriate measures.

By harping on the presence of West Germany in the Western military alliance, the USSR was able to capitalize on the all too recent memories of World War II harbored by the Eastern European populations and was able, with apparent logic, to suggest that the military organization of the European Communist states was the only rational means of coping with the alleged revival of West German revanchism. The inclusion of Bonn in NATO was similarly helpful to local regimes in these states by providing them with a justification for their formal military and political subservience to the Soviet Union; i.e., they were making a conscientious effort to protect their citizenry from ravages by a newly militant Germany, a subject around which some support for the party could be rallied.

Thus, as a propaganda tool the pact served to illustrate "the defensive and peaceful character" of Soviet military relationships, to cast the USSR in the role of protector of Eastern Europe and to gain some popular backing for the local Communist parties.

COOPERATIVE MILITARY ALLIANCE

Despite Soviet efforts to make the Warsaw Pact assume the character of a viable military alliance, the USSR until recently avoided meaningful military integration of the member states. Prior to 1961, military cooperation was limited largely to establishing and operating an integrated Soviet-controlled bloc air defense, to pro-

viding the Eastern Europeans with technical information necessary for the production of Soviet-type weapons, and to a general standardization of weapons used by the armed forces of the member states. Military leaders and delegations exchanged visits, and broad strategic tasks were given a general definition, but there was neither real military integration nor frequent and regular combined maneuvers of the various Communist forces.

RELATIONSHIP TO SERIES OF EXISTING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS OF
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

On 15 May 1955, one day after the signing of the Warsaw Treaty, the Austrian State Treaty was signed in the Belvedere Palace in Vienna. As a result, the original justification for the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania—protection of the USSR supply lines to Austria—no longer existed. The Soviet Union, moreover, was obligated to withdraw its forces from the two countries within 40 days after the new treaty took effect.

Thus, some new basis to permit the continued presence of Soviet troops in these two countries was necessary; the Warsaw Pact provided this. It also established terms under which the Soviet Union could claim legitimacy for its armed presence in other Eastern European countries, if necessary.

By 1950 the USSR had concluded bilateral mutual aid treaties with all of the members of the Soviet bloc which were to become signatories of the Warsaw Pact (except East Germany, with which it did not conclude such a treaty until 1964, and Albania, which has a mutual aid treaty only with Bulgaria). None of these treaties of friendship and mutual assistance, however, provided a firm juridical basis for the stationing of Soviet troops on the territory of a treaty partner. Although the terms of the Warsaw Pact agreement regarding this were general and referred vaguely to "agreed measures," they did provide for the formation of a Unified Armed Force and took the first step toward regularization of the status of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe.

After the widespread political turmoil that weakened Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe in 1956, the stationing of Soviet troops in that area was further regularized by a series of "status of forces" agreements, which in effect used the Warsaw Treaty as their point of departure without any formal reference to it. Since the USSR certainly wielded the power necessary to conclude these agreements independently of the Warsaw Pact framework, its use as a point of departure for the agreements signified Soviet awareness of the pact's value as a means of coping with the threat of political diversity in Eastern Europe.

BILATERAL TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
SIGNED BY WARSAW PACT MEMBERS

	USSR	Poland	Czech	Hung	Rum	Bul	E.G.
USSR-----		FMA 4-45 r. 4-65	FMA 12-48 r. 12-63 FMA 3-47	FMA 2-48	FMA 2-48	FMA 3-48	FMA 6-64
Poland-----	FMA 4-45 r. 4-65			FMA 6-48	FMA 1-49	FMA 6-48	F 7-50
Czechoslovakia-----	FMA 12-43 r. 12-63	FMA 3-47		FMA 4-49	FMA 7-48	FMA 4-48	F 6-50
Hungary-----	FMA 2-48	FMA 6-48	FMA 4-49		FMA 1-48	FMA 7-48	F 6-50
Rumania-----	FMA 2-48	FMA 1-49	FMA 7-48	FMA 1-48		FMA 1-48	F 8-50
Bulgaria-----	FMA 3-48	FMA 6-48	FMA 4-48	FMA 7-48	FMA 1-48		F 8-50
East Germany-----	FMA 6-64	F 7-50	F 6-50	F 6-50	F 8-50	F 8-50	-----

FMA—Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty.
F —Friendship Treaty.
r. —Renewed.

The treaties are valid for a period of twenty years and commit the co-signatories to mutual defense against aggression, particularly aggression by a rearmcd German state. In this regard the treaties concluded with East Germany were called only Friendship treaties. It was not until June 1964 that the GDR-Soviet Union agreement was upgraded to the level of a treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. To date none of the other Pact countries have followed the Soviet lead with a similar upgrading. In two cases treaties have been renewed, between the USSR and Czechoslovakia and the USSR and Poland. Albania has not been included since it has signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance only with Bulgaria, an agreement the two states concluded in December 1947.

HOW IT IS ORGANIZED AND OPERATES

At the Warsaw conference of May 1955 establishing the Warsaw Treaty Organization, two major bodies were created to carry out the functions of the pact: the Political Consultative Committee, and the Unified Command of Pact Armed Forces, both headquartered in Moscow.

According to the terms of the treaty the Political Consultative Committee—on which each state is represented by a specially appointed official—is charged with coordinating all activities of the pact organization, with the exception of purely military matters. However, "general questions pertaining to the strengthening of the defense capacity and to the organization of the joint armed forces of the states that are parties to the treaty will be examined by the PCC, which will take appropriate decisions." Additional committee responsibilities involve consideration of important foreign policy decisions, and the use of the PCC by member states to consult "on their common interests" and to develop the "economic and cultural cooperation of the partners." Only the first of these functions seemed to be of importance until the early 1960's.

The PCC in May 1955 was further empowered to form auxiliary organs for which "a need may arise" in executing its responsibilities. Accordingly a Permanent Commission, located in Moscow, and a

Joint Secretariat, also situated in the Soviet capital, were created at the second meeting of the Committee in Prague in January 1956. At this same meeting it was also decided that the Political Consultative Committee would convene at least twice a year but could meet more frequently if its members desired.

The Permanent Commission, the most significant of the two auxiliary organs, has competence for the development of recommendations on foreign policy questions of importance to pact members, while the Joint Secretariat is responsible for administering "those technical fields serving the realization of treaty goals." Both bodies are dominated by the Soviets, and the Soviet head of the Joint Secretariat is also the Chief of Staff of the Unified Command of Pact Armed Forces.


The Unified Command of Pact Armed Forces has paramount authority over the troops assigned to it by the member states of the pact. According to the terms of the treaty, the Unified Command is enjoined to "strengthen the defensive capability of the Warsaw Pact, to prepare military plans in case of war and to decide on the deployment of troops" assigned to the pact forces, which consist of contingents of national units designated for assignment to the Unified Command.

At the initial convocation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, it was agreed that the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces would be a representative of the Soviet Union. He is supported by a General Staff, which includes permanent representatives of the general staffs of the member states, and is assisted by eight deputies, traditionally the ministers of defense of the countries party to the treaty, although the deputies theoretically may be drawn from a lower military echelon. Even though these deputies are appointed and recalled by the governments of their respective states independently of the Unified Command, the integrated staffs of the Command function supra-nationally.

On paper, the organization of the Warsaw Pact bespeaks impressive coordination among its members on political and military matters, but the actual operation is a different matter. The Political Consultative Committee meetings have served principally as a forum for the articulation of a common stand on important international issues as proposed by the USSR. The Joint Command of Pact Armed Forces has also been under complete Soviet domination, with both the posts of Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the General Staff held by Russian officers.

THE WARSAW PACT

WARSAW PACT STRUCTURE



THE WARSAW PACT TODAY AND ITS VALUE TO THE USSR

MILITARY VALUE

Since 1961, the Soviet Union has been carrying out a program to upgrade the military significance of the Warsaw Pact, particularly in terms of its use as an instrument of common defense of the Communist camp. This policy has resulted in the holding of combined pact training exercises and in considerable modernization of the equipment of the pact forces commensurate with their apparently enlarged responsibilities.

COORDINATION OF MILITARY PLANNING, EQUIPMENT AND STRATEGY

The late 1950's were marked by the first steps to elevate the importance of the military contribution of the Eastern European countries in over-all Soviet military planning, with a concurrent increase in emphasis on a more active joint role for pact forces in defensive and offensive theater operations. Soviet attention to the cooperative aspects of the alliance was heightened during the Berlin crisis of 1961.

In September of that year, the defense ministers of the countries involved gathered in Warsaw for the first publicly announced meeting devoted wholly to military matters. In October Soviet, East German, Polish and Czechoslovak forces participated in a major field exercise, the first of a series of such annual combined training exercises. According to Marshal Grechko, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, these exercises are of great importance because of their "contributions to further growth of the combat might of our joint

armed forces, to higher standards of training, to better coordination of forces and staffs, and to the elaboration of common views on methods of nuclear and conventional warfare."

In addition to undertaking combined exercises, the Soviets introduced a program of re-equipment and modernization of the Eastern European armed forces. On the whole, the modernization program and the training given the Eastern European armies prepared them principally for conducting theater warfare under nuclear conditions. Except for Albania all of the Soviet bloc countries, however, have been furnished with potential nuclear delivery systems in the form of tactical missiles or aircraft. Even though the nuclear warheads for these weapons presumably are kept in Soviet hands, possession of missiles and attack aircraft by Eastern European armed forces increases the possibility of nuclear sharing within the pact at some future time.

STATIONING OF SOVIET TROOPS IN EASTERN EUROPE

As noted earlier, the Warsaw Pact's initial military significance lay in the fact that it provided justification for the stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. This Soviet presence facilitated the adoption of Soviet organizational forms and field doctrine by the local armies, as well as the standardization of weapons and local arms production along Soviet lines. Finally, the deploying of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe (in East Germany, Poland and Hungary) serves as a guarantee of sorts for the existence of a political atmosphere which best serves Soviet interests.

Since the late 1950's, however, when the Soviet Union first showed a greater appreciation of the benefits to be derived from closer military integration within the pact, the role of the Soviet troops in Eastern Europe has undergone a significant change. The USSR was prompted to conclude status-of-force agreements after the events of 1956, and great pains were taken to stress the legal restrictions and juridical safeguards governing the actions of the Soviet military in the other pact countries. Emphasis now is placed on the equality between the armed forces of the host country and the Soviet troops, with considerable propaganda effort devoted to demonstrating "the development of comradely bonds" resulting from the combined exercises of pact troops.

Although military collaboration between the Soviet Union and the other pact members may not have proceeded as far as some official accounts seek to convey, the fact remains that the Soviet Union has found it useful to stress the close military bonds among the Warsaw Pact members. One important Soviet motive can be traced to the fact that Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, in addition to their deployment opposite NATO, have long had a kind of garrison function to insure that regimes sympathetic to Soviet policy remain in power. As the countries of Eastern Europe have gradually acquired a measure of autonomy in their economic, cultural and political affairs, the garrison aspect of Russia's military presence became increasingly awkward for Moscow. The Warsaw Pact, however, confers collective sanction on the Soviet presence in the name of defense against the NATO threat.

FORWARD DEFENSE AREA

Closer military integration of the Eastern European armies into Soviet operational plans has been noteworthy for the particular at-

tention given to East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the so-called "northern tier" countries, referred to in public statements by bloc officials as "the first strategic echelon" of the Warsaw Pact. The regional differentiation between the states of the northern group and those constituting the southern sector of the alliance stems from their relative importance as a forward defense area. Since the territory of these northern countries would be the main axis for a central European campaign in time of war, the Soviets have shown greater interest in them. Another contributing factor is the role this area has traditionally played as a defensive buffer zone against a possible land invasion from the West, a concept that has remained alive in Soviet military thought despite the fact that such a traditional military invasion of the Soviet Union in the nuclear age is a remote contingency.

The difficulty of deploying substantial reinforcements from the USSR in the event of nuclear war makes an effective Warsaw Pact force, already in place close to the arena of European conflict, a highly attractive project.

USE TO PLAN ACTIONS ELSEWHERE THAN EUROPE

There has been no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union has contemplated use of the armed forces of the pact, committed by the terms of the treaty only to a European defense system, to initiate or support military actions elsewhere. For example, during the Suez crisis of 1956 there was no mobilization of pact forces. During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Soviets attempted to maintain a non-provocative stance in terms of the treaty organization, and again there was no build-up or mobilization of pact forces.

The most significant concentration of Soviet forces and the most effective troop contingents assigned to the pact are in the previously mentioned "northern tier" countries, which have geographic and strategic political importance only in terms of a European conflict. Inasmuch as the pact armed forces have never been assigned a role outside of the context of the European theater, it is unlikely that they would be used in any other way—such as sending units to Vietnam—in the future, particularly since some of the Eastern European countries have been taking an increasingly independent stand toward pact command arrangements. The USSR, in fact, probably is finding that it can no longer singlehandedly decide in all cases the disposition of pact troops.

POLITICAL VALUE

On the surface, it seems inconsistent that the USSR has adopted a policy of strengthening its Eastern European allies at the very time they are becoming politically less tractable. The political benefits derived by the Soviet Union from the Warsaw Pact, however, are probably at least as great as the military benefits.

Thus Political Consultative Committee communiques and resolutions have been so phrased as to indicate unanimity and to underline strongly the status of the USSR as the spokesman for the Communist movement. Even in 1961, when intra-bloc relations were exacerbated by the growing tensions of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Russians were able to use the Warsaw Pact to maintain a show of unity

by issuing strongly worded complaints against the West, particularly in regard to the German question and disarmament.

The USSR also used the periodic and irregular gatherings of the Political Consultative Committee (see appendix D, p. 32,) to pressure a reluctant member to accept the "majority view" or, if this was impossible, to persuade the other governments in the alliance to join with them in isolating the dissident.³ This method was employed to bring about and to justify the ouster of Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy. At the end of the 1956 revolution, Nagy was charged with violating the unity of the bloc by his unilateral decision to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. Similar pressure was brought to bear against the Albanians in June 1962, when they were excluded from participation in a meeting in Moscow of the pact's Political Consultative Committee.

The Soviets also found the Warsaw Pact a useful device for rebutting Chinese charges that Moscow was a disintegrating influence in the Communist camp. The communiqué issued after the March 1961 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee pointedly stated that the PCC was "guided by the theoretical and political conclusions of the November 1960 Conference of representatives of Communist and Workers Parties" and by the "historic documents" of that conference. Such an announcement was devised to put the Soviet Union firmly on the side of the angels, and to emphasize that it was the Chinese and Albanians (neither the Albanian party or government chiefs attended the meeting) who were disrupting the unity of the bloc and rejecting the good offices of the USSR and its supporters.

With the growth of economic pragmatism and the appearance of more nationalistically oriented policy stands by the Eastern European regimes, a new situation in Soviet bloc relations gradually came into being in the early 1960's. Moscow's apparent hopes to use the Political Consultative Committee genuinely "for the purpose of consultations" among the parties to the treaty foundered on the rocks of national differences. Today the USSR has little capability to override dissenting elements within the pact by political pressure; even those countries willing to follow the Soviet line are reluctant to join in isolating more independent members in case they too should one day wish to pursue a path of their own choosing. The failure of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee to meet since January 1965 is probably a reflection of the growing weakness of this body as an instrument for achieving a political consensus, much less interparty unity.

ECONOMIC COST TO USSR OF A MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM EASTERN EUROPE

Although the military base system of the Soviet armed forces in Hungary, Poland and especially East Germany is rather extensive, a relinquishment of those facilities to the present Eastern European governments should pose no economically significant obstacle to a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Europe.

³ This type of pressure tactic is one of the main reasons accounting for Rumania's oft-voiced view in recent years that bloc decisions are binding only with unanimous—rather than mere majority—support. Communist China has constantly reiterated this point also during the years of its dispute with Moscow and the Soviet bloc. The USSR has never been willing formally to accept this view because it would give any one of the Eastern European countries veto power. As a practical matter, however, it has on a number of occasions found it necessary to accede implicitly to the unanimity rule.

The question of the exact value of the Soviet military investment in fixed facilities in Eastern Europe is complicated, as is perhaps best illustrated by examining the case of East Germany. The bulk of the Soviet military forces outside the USSR are stationed in East Germany; and the extent of Soviet control and exploitation of the Eastern European countries has, in the long run, probably been greatest in East Germany.

The Soviet forces in East Germany (GSFG) are mobile field forces and hence can be withdrawn to the Soviet Union on short notice. Although available information does not permit any highly accurate computations of the economic value of the GSFG's fixed facilities, it is believed that a significant portion, if not all, were built at the expense of the Germans both before and after 1945. In any event, the East German economy suffers from a shortage of storage and housing facilities and could well use any facilities vacated by Soviet troops. There is little reason to suspect that the East Germans would not make it economically worthwhile for the Soviets to leave.

The purpose of the Soviet presence in East Germany is no longer the exploitation of the East German economy, but the maintenance of Soviet strategic interests. The only remaining aspects which may still have economic importance for the USSR are the relatively minor economic advantages of garrisoning troops in East Germany instead of the USSR, and the more significant operation of the uranium mines.

The Soviet Union has already given up most of the economic advantages derived from the 1945 occupation of the Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet sector of Berlin. At the end of 1953, the USSR cancelled the balance owed by East Germany on the reparations account, and arranged to turn back to East Germany the last of the enterprises seized after the war—except for the uranium mines, which the USSR will probably retain until the ore is exhausted.

By 1956, the East Germans finished paying for the enterprises which had reverted to their control. Occupation cost payments were progressively reduced in 1954, 1956, and 1958, and finally discontinued in 1959.

Soviet withdrawal, then, apparently would neither jeopardize significant economic interests, nor pose economic costs of a size that would be difficult to negotiate.

ESTIMATED PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES

	Poland	Czecho- slovakia	East Ger- many	Hungary	Rumania	Bulgaria	Albania ¹	Total ²
Ground Forces.....	215,000	200,000	80,000	100,000	175,000	125,000	30,000	895,000
Naval Forces.....	17,000		17,000		8,000	7,000	3,000	49,000
Air Forces.....	45,000	35,000	15,000	9,000	15,000	20,000	5,000	139,000
TOTAL ARMED FORCES.....	277,000	235,000	112,000	109,000	198,000	152,000	38,000	1,033,000
Militarized Security Forces.....	45,000	35,000	70,000	35,000	60,000	15,000	12,500	260,000

¹ Although Albania no longer participates in Warsaw Pact affairs, it remains a nominal member and is included in this chart for comparative purposes.

² Not including Albania.

BENEFITS DERIVED BY EASTERN EUROPE FROM THE PACT

ASSURANCE OF PROTECTION AGAINST GERMANY

Whether the belief is justified or not, the Federal German Republic remains a real threat in the minds of many Eastern Europeans and thus has served the governments of the Warsaw Pact states as a valuable propaganda justification for their close relations with the Soviet Union. Typical of the attitude of Eastern European Communist regimes toward West Germany is the statement made on 26 March 1966 by Jan Karol Wende, Vice Marshal of the Parliament of the Polish People's Republic:

. . . the Federal German Republic is the only state in Europe whose government wants to thwart the results of World War II, officially puts forward territorial claims to Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, and is striving, under the slogan of "reunification" for annexation of the GDR. . . . Any attempts at undermining the political and territorial status quo in Europe threaten an armed conflict, which in this part of the world would inevitably turn into a world conflagration

As a consequence of this fear of a possible revival of German militarism, the Eastern Europeans view a military alliance with the USSR as the most practical means, and perhaps the only feasibility, to protect themselves from the traditional German threat to the area. Certainly the collective security arrangements of the pact give them a greater measure of defense than they could ever obtain with their own resources.

Both the regimes and the people of these countries are also highly sensitive to situations which, in their eyes, constitute potential nuclear war hazards. They regard the presence of NATO nuclear weapons in West Germany as a principal deterrent to conclusion of the German peace treaty and stress that their reliance on the nuclear capability of the Soviet Union is necessary in order to avert the possible aggressive aims of a reactionary West German Government.

For some of the countries—specifically Poland and Czechoslovakia—membership in the Warsaw Pact under the aegis of the USSR gives them some measure of assurance that they will be able to retain the territories they acquired from Germany at the end of the war—acquisitions which more than 20 years later still lack the legality of a peace treaty.

MODERN ARMAMENTS

As a result of the extensive supply program begun by the Soviets almost 15 years ago, and the local manufacture of military equipment in Eastern Europe, a high degree of standardization of materiel has been achieved among the armed forces of the pact member states (see appendix C, p. 31, for Eastern European military budgets). This process has not only facilitated simpler wartime weapons coordination but has also made peacetime production and supply of modern weapons easier. No Eastern European country has been permitted to establish either an autonomous manufacturing capability for a complete range of military equipment and supplies, or a fully adequate war reserve.

Despite some time lag between the appearance of particular weapons and supplies as standard in the Soviet army and the supply of the same items to the Eastern European armies, Moscow has generally made up-to-date military materiel available to them. The bulk of equipment used by these forces today is concurrently standard in the Soviet military forces.

Although nuclear weapons currently deployed in Eastern Europe are under the control of the Soviet forces stationed there, tactical missiles and new generation aircraft have been directly assigned to the armed forces of Poland, Rumania, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and apparently Bulgaria. Possession of these weapons undoubtedly increases the stature of the bloc armed forces, and there is no doubt that their ability to conduct modern warfare has become far greater as a result of Soviet tutelage.

SUPPORT FOR REGIMES IN POWER

Although the Warsaw Pact plays a role as the guarantor of power for local Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, this should not be given undue emphasis. Dissolution of the pact as a formal organization, and even the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Eastern European countries, would not spell the end to Communist domination in those countries. In fact, particularly in view of the growing strength of "national Communism," and its acceptability to most Soviet bloc leaders, such a turn of events would probably make the several Communist governments more palatable to the populations of those areas. The majority of the citizens of Eastern Europe tend to regard some form of socialist government as the only practical method for establishing and maintaining sound economies in their respective countries.

However, it would also be unwise to underestimate the psychological advantage the Eastern European governments derive from emphasizing their membership in the Warsaw Pact. Reiteration by the Eastern European leaders of the closeness of cooperation between the local army and Soviet troops, as well as pointed references to Soviet military might, are subtle but effective reminders. They deter any considerations of political independence among the satellite populations as forcefully as the more flagrant methods of coercion, terrorism and blatant Soviet domination experienced under Stalin. The "psychological shadow," as it has been termed by George Kennan, cast by the presence of the Soviet troops in Eastern Europe certainly falls across the consciousness of those who are citizens of the states belonging to the Warsaw Pact, and can only serve to remind them that in all probability their destinies are bound with that of the Soviet Union for some time to come.

PROBLEMS WITHIN THE PACT

EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BECOMING LESS TRACTABLE

The CPSU is against any hegemony in the Communist movement, for genuinely internationalist relations of equality among all the parties. . . . The strengthening of unity requires observance of the standards of relations among the parties worked out collectively by them; complete

equality and independence, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, mutual support and international solidarity.

These remarks, made by Leonid Brezhnev, Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at the 23rd Party Congress in March 1966, are not hollow words. They reflect Soviet recognition and acceptance of the growing diversity within the Communist world, and particularly of the centrifugal forces at work within the Warsaw Pact. The USSR, by deciding to accept what it cannot prevent without an undue and counterproductive show of force, has given its stamp of approval to an increased independence on the part of its pact partners. In so doing, Moscow obviously hopes to preserve the unity, as well as the military and political effectiveness, of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

In admitting the necessity of working out problems collectively, the USSR is apparently responding to pressures from the Eastern European regimes for a greater voice in the conduct of pact affairs. Indeed, by accepting that "business-like contacts and political consultations between leaders of the fraternal parties of the socialist countries have become a system," the Soviet Union again has given necessity the mark of virtue. Even so, the USSR has not been able to convene a meeting of pact states at the first secretary or ministerial level since the last convocation of the Political Consultative Committee in January, 1965. Under the terms of the pact, it is supposed to meet twice a year.

Even in those instances where an Eastern European regime has deliberately rejected the lead of the Soviet Union, the others have been reluctant to condemn the dissenting member. For instance Rumania's unilateral reduction of the term of service in its armed forces from 24 to 16 months has drawn no censure, at least in public, from the other members of the alliance. They have also been willing to tolerate Bucharest's insistence on full independence in economic policy and foreign policy—Rumanian determination to straddle the fence in the Sino-Soviet dispute—as well as the Rumanian overtures to the West. The reasons for this are clear. By refusing to criticize Rumania's right to pursue an independent course, the other members of the alliance are establishing a precedent that will serve them well should their own national interests diverge from those of the pact as a whole.

There is also evidence that the Eastern European members of the pact, including those who consider maintenance of the alliance at least a military if not a political necessity, disagree over the current organization and chain of command under which the pact now operates. Marshal Grechko has referred to the need to reorganize the structure, and Václav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, in his 15 March 1966 speech to the National Assembly, spoke of the need for "further strengthening the Warsaw Pact organization." Disagreements on the future structure and organization of the Warsaw Pact reportedly became evident at the last PCC meeting in January 1965. They apparently remain unresolved.

Another factor which obviously has considerable bearing on the smoothness with which the Warsaw alliance operates is the differing relationships that its various member governments have with the Soviet Union. The greatest degree of friction exists, of course, between the USSR and Albania, which for all practical purposes has read itself out of the pact; the friction stems from Albania's rigidly

pro-Chinese stand. Rumania has maintained correct relations with the USSR, but has pointedly refused to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Within the pact, Rumania has refused to attend meetings whenever it appeared possible that the gathering might prove to be a forum for anti-Chinese propaganda. Poland and Czechoslovakia support the USSR in the Sino-Soviet dispute, although Poland has taken a more moderate stand on the problem. Both of these countries tend to regard close support of the Soviet lead as a guarantee of protection against Germany. East Germany has had no choice but to be a faithful and willing ally of Soviet foreign policy. The relationship of the Hungarian regime to the USSR tends to be passive, largely because of Hungary's economic dependence on the Soviet Union. As party First Secretary Kadar said at the 23rd CPSU Congress, "We support enhancing the effectiveness of international organizations of such great importance for socialism and peace as the Warsaw Pact and CEMA."

RELIABILITY OF EASTERN EUROPEAN FORCES

The inclusion of the armed forces of the Eastern European countries in the pact has greatly increased the quantity of manpower available to the USSR, but the question of their reliability, if called upon to fight with the Soviet Union, remains a major factor for consideration. If the bloc forces were called upon to support the USSR in a defensive campaign in hostilities initiated by West Germany, it is likely that the pact's Eastern European armies would fight with their Soviet comrades. It is also possible that the countries individually might fight an effective offensive campaign, provided that it was directed against one of their traditional national enemies; for example Poles and Czechs would wage an offensive campaign against the Germans, or the Bulgarians against the Greeks and Turks. History indicates, however, that the national armies of the bloc countries are hardly entirely reliable allies. Units of the Hungarian Army actively fought the Russians in the 1956 revolution. A decisive portion of the Polish Army was prepared to resist any use of military force by the Russians to prevent the appointment of Gomulka in October 1956.

The current Soviet Party leaders have had difficulty in persuading the various pact members to pull their proper weight within the alliance, as has been noted in Rumania's reluctance to accept the burdens entailed by larger pact commitments. Nationalism has also created problems elsewhere, even among stalwart Soviet supporters. In April 1965, for instance, a nationalist faction of the Bulgarian army attempted a coup apparently aimed at directing Bulgarian policy along more independent lines. The Soviets have sought to explain away such soft spots in the pact by claiming publicly that "imperialist" attempts to split the bloc would prove futile. This type of comment reflects, of course, a certain helplessness in dealing with the problem of obtaining cooperation at a time when the national interests of the Eastern European countries are permitted greater play in their policy making.

EASTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERS FEAR NUCLEAR WAR

Another reason for the determination of Eastern European members to assume a greater voice in Warsaw Pact decisions is their

reluctance to become involved in a nuclear war. Leaders of the non-Soviet member governments are apparently interested in achieving a policy-making role for themselves commensurate with the vulnerability of their positions as sites for Soviet nuclear weapons. The possibility of their involuntary involvement in a nuclear war became clear to them during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. As members of the Warsaw Pact and therefore allies of the USSR, they were implicitly involved and would have been subject to the same consequences as Moscow if the Soviet missile build-up in Cuba had led to war.

EFFECT ON DECISION MAKING PROCESS

The divisive factors which have been at work within the Warsaw alliance are having repercussions within the policy-making mechanisms of the pact as the Eastern European members of the alliance have begun to press for a more influential voice in matters affecting their own interests, such as choice of strategy, sharing of military and economic burdens, and resolution of foreign policy issues bearing on the question of war or peace. It seems fairly certain that efforts to alleviate these pressures will take the form of some sort of reorganization of the pact structure. In mid-September 1965 Brezhnev, in commenting on the need to strengthen bloc unity, remarked that "the current situation places on the agenda the further perfection of the Warsaw Pact organization. We are all prepared to work diligently in order to find the best solution." The Soviet party leader revealed shortly thereafter that a series of talks with Eastern European leaders had dealt with the need for establishing within the Warsaw Pact organization "a permanent and operating mechanism for considering urgent problems."

However, the role and nature of the Warsaw Pact appears to be conditioned in large part by two closely related factors: the degree to which the Soviets place reliance upon the other pact forces, and the extent of actual Soviet dependence upon them. The USSR will doubtless be prepared to accept some diminution of its authority within the Warsaw alliance to the extent that it feels dependent on the other pact forces. Although the advent of the missile age seems, on the surface at least, to have somewhat reduced Soviet military dependence on the Warsaw allies, other considerations, both military and political, suggest that on balance Soviet dependence on the Warsaw allies probably is becoming greater.

Trends along the above lines, with greater emphasis on military integration and interdependence and assertion of separate national interests, will probably result in a new balance of decision-making power among the pact's members. From the Soviet viewpoint, the alliance continues to perform an important political function. It has proven more effective than any other multilateral institution in holding the bloc together and still provides the basic treaty obligation binding the Eastern European states to the Soviet Union.

Although it would be unrealistic to suppose that the USSR will cease to play a predominant role in pact affairs, the trends at work within the treaty organization suggest that the pact may be evolving toward an alliance of a more customary kind, subject to a greater degree than previously to the interplay of coalition politics, and that the Eastern European partners may derive greater political, cultural and economic autonomy in the course of such an evolution.

APPENDIX A

TEXT OF WARSAW PACT AGREEMENT¹

TREATY

of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
Between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's
Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic,
the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's
Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak
Republic

The Contracting Parties, reaffirming their desire for the establish-
ment of a system of European collective security based on the par-
ticipation of all European states irrespective of their social and
political systems, which would make it possible to unite their efforts
in safeguarding the peace of Europe;

mindful, at the same time, of the situation created in Europe by
the ratification of the Paris agreements, which envisage the formation
of a new military alignment in the shape of "Western European
Union," with the participation of a remilitarized Western Germany
and the integration of the latter in the North-Atlantic bloc, which
increases the danger of another war and constitutes a threat to the
national security of the peaceable states;

being persuaded that in these circumstances the peaceable European
states must take the necessary measures to safeguard their security
and in the interests of preserving peace in Europe;

guided by the objects and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations Organization;

being desirous of further promoting and developing friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance in accordance with the principles
of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and of non-
interference in their internal affairs,

have decided to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Cooper-
ation and Mutual Assistance and have for that purpose appointed as
their plenipotentiaries:

the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of
Albania: Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
People's Republic of Albania;

the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of
Bulgaria: Vylko Chervenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria;

the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic: Andras Hegedus,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's
Republic;

the President of the German Democratic Republic: Otto
Grotewohl, Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic;

¹ As published in *New Times*, No. 21, 21 May 1955 (MOSCOW).

the State Council of the Polish People's Republic: Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic;

the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the Rumanian People's Republic: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic;

the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.;

the President of the Czechoslovak Republic: Viliam Siroky, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic,

who, having presented their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes peacefully and in such manner as will not jeopardize international peace and security.

Article 2

The Contracting Parties declare their readiness to participate in a spirit of sincere cooperation in all international actions designed to safeguard international peace and security, and will fully devote their energies to the attainment of this end.

The Contracting Parties will furthermore strive for the adoption, in agreement with other states which may desire to cooperate in this, of effective measures for universal reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

Article 3

The Contracting Parties shall consult with one another on all important international issues affecting their common interests, guided by the desire to strengthen international peace and security.

They shall immediately consult with one another whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, a threat of armed attack on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty has arisen, in order to ensure joint defence and the maintenance of peace and security.

Article 4

In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force. The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be

taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Measures taken on the basis of this Article shall be reported to the Security Council in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization. These measures shall be discontinued immediately the Security Council adopts the necessary measures to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 5

The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Joint Command of the armed forces that by agreement among the Parties shall be assigned to the Command, which shall function on the basis of jointly established principles. They shall likewise adopt other agreed measures necessary to strengthen their defensive power, in order to protect the peaceful labours of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and provide defence against possible aggression.

Article 6

For the purpose of the consultations among the Parties envisaged in the present Treaty, and also for the purpose of examining questions which may arise in the operation of the Treaty, a Political Consultative Committee shall be set up, in which each of the Parties to the Treaty shall be represented by a member of its Government or by another specifically appointed representative.

The Committee may set up such auxiliary bodies as may prove necessary.

Article 7

The Contracting Parties undertake not to participate in any coalitions or alliances and not to conclude any agreements whose objects conflict with the objects of the present Treaty.

The Contracting Parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties do not conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article 8

The Contracting Parties declare that they will act in a spirit of friendship and cooperation with a view to further developing and fostering economic and cultural intercourse with one another, each adhering to the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the others and non-interference in their internal affairs.

Article 9

The present Treaty is open to the accession of other states irrespective of their social and political systems, which express their readiness by participation in the present Treaty to assist in uniting the efforts of the peaceable states in safeguarding the peace and security of the peoples. Such accession shall enter into force with the agreement of the Parties to the Treaty after the declaration of accession has been deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

Article 10

The present Treaty is subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

The Treaty shall enter into force on the day the last instrument of ratification has been deposited. The Government of the Polish People's Republic shall notify the other Parties to the Treaty as each instrument of ratification is deposited.

Article 11

The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years. For such Contracting Parties as do not at least one year before the expiration of this period present to the Government of the Polish People's Republic a statement of denunciation of the Treaty, it shall remain in force for the next ten years.

Should a system of collective security be established in Europe, and a General European Treaty of Collective Security concluded for this purpose, for which the Contracting Parties will unswervingly strive, the present Treaty shall cease to be operative from the day the General European Treaty enters into force.

Done in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, in one copy each in the Russian, Polish, Czech and German languages, all texts being equally authentic. Certified copies of the present Treaty shall be sent by the Government of the Polish People's Republic to all the Parties to the Treaty.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and affixed their seals.

For the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania

MEHMET SHEHU

For the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

VYLKO CHERVENKOV

For the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic

ANDRAS HEGEDUS

For the President of the German Democratic Republic

OTTO GROTEWOHL

For the State Council of the Polish People's Republic

JOZEF CYRANKIEWICZ

For the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the Rumanian People's Republic

GHEORGHE GHEORGHIU-DEJ

For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

NIKOLAI ALEXANDROVICH BULGANIN

For the President of the Czechoslovak Republic

VILIAM SIROKY

ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMAND

of the Armed Forces of the Signatories to the Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance

In pursuance of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic, the signatory states have decided to establish a Joint Command of their armed forces.

The decision provides that general questions relating to the strengthening of the defensive power and the organization of the Joint Armed Forces of the signatory states shall be subject to examination by the Political Consultative Committee, which shall adopt the necessary decisions.

Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces to be assigned by the signatory states.

The Ministers of Defence or other military leaders of the signatory states are to serve as Deputy Commanders-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and shall command the armed forces assigned by their respective states to the Joint Armed Forces.

The question of the participation of the German Democratic Republic in measures concerning the armed forces of the Joint Command will be examined at a later date.

A Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the signatory states will be set up under the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and will include permanent representatives of the General Staffs of the signatory states.

The Staff will have its headquarters in Moscow.

The disposition of the Joint Armed Forces in the territories of the signatory states will be effected, by agreement among the states, in accordance with the requirements of their mutual defence.

APPENDIX B

COMPARISON OF WARSAW PACT TREATY AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY¹

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, Warsaw, May 14, 1955

North Atlantic Treaty

April 14, 1949

[Preamble]

[Preamble]

The contracting parties again confirm their desire for the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe, based on the participation in it of all European states, irrespective of their social and state order, which would permit the unification of their efforts in the interests of safeguarding peace in Europe.

Taking into consideration at the same time the situation which has arisen in Europe as the result of the ratification of the Paris Agreements envisaging the formation of a new military alignment in the form of the West European Union with the participation of West Germany, which is being remilitarized, and her inclusion in the North Atlantic bloc, which increases the danger of a new war and creates a threat to the national security of peace-loving states; being convinced of the fact that in these circumstances peace-loving states in Europe must take measures necessary to safeguard their security and in the interests of preserving peace in Europe; guided by the aims and principles of the U.N. Charter; and in the interests of the further strengthening and developing of friendship, collaboration, and mutual assistance in accordance with the principles of respecting the independence and sovereignty of the states and non-inter-

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

¹ Comparison prepared in the Department of State, 20 May 1955.

ference in their internal affairs, the contracting parties have decided to conclude the present treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance and have appointed the following as their representatives: [signatures omitted]

ARTICLE I

The contracting parties pledge themselves, in accordance with the U.N. Charter, to refrain in their international relations from threatening force or from using it, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, in such a way as not to threaten international peace and security.

ARTICLE II

The contracting parties declare their readiness to participate, in a spirit of sincere collaboration, in all international missions aimed at safeguarding international peace and security, and will devote their strength fully to the realization of these aims. Hereby the contracting parties will strive for the adoption, in agreements with other states which wish to collaborate in this matter, of effective measures for the general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other types of mass destruction weapons.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

[No equivalent in NATO]

North Atlantic Treaty—Continued

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Treaty of Friendship—Continued

ARTICLE III

The contracting parties will consult with each other in regard to all important questions touching upon their common interests, being guided by the interests of the strengthening of international peace and security. They will consult with each other without delay at any time when, in the opinion of any of them, there may occur the threat of an armed attack on one or several states participating in the treaty, in the interests of a resolute joint defense and the maintenance of peace and security.

ARTICLE IV

In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or several states participating in the Treaty, by any state or group of states, each of the states participating in the treaty, will, by virtue of the right to individual or collective self-defense, in conformity with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, offer to the state or states subjected to the attack immediate assistance, individually or in agreement with other states participating in the treaty, with all the means which it considers necessary, including the use of armed force.

The states participating in the treaty will immediately consult as to the joint measures which it may be necessary to undertake for the purpose of restoring and maintaining international peace and security. The measures adopted on the basis of this article will be reported to the Security Council, in conformity with the articles of the U.N. Charter. These measures will be suspended as soon as the Security Council launches measures necessary for the

ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

restoration and maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE V

The contracting powers have agreed to set up a joint command of their Armed Forces, to be placed, according to agreement among the powers, at the disposal of this command acting on the basis of jointly established principles. They will also launch other agreed measures necessary for the strengthening of their defense capacity in order to protect the peaceful toil of their peoples, to guarantee the integrity of their frontiers and territories, and to insure defense against possible aggression.

ARTICLE VI

With the object of carrying out consultations, provided for by the present treaty, among the states participating in the treaty and for the examination of questions arising in connection with the realization of this treaty, a Political Consultative Committee is being set up in which each state participating in the treaty will be represented by a member of its Government or another specially appointed representative. The committee may set up any auxiliary organs it considers necessary.

ARTICLE VII

The contracting powers pledge themselves to refrain from taking part in coalitions or alliances of any kind and from concluding any agreements the aims of which contradict the aims of this treaty. The contracting powers declare that their commitments by effective international treaties are in no contradiction to the theses of this treaty.

ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 9

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Treaty of Friendship—Continued

ARTICLE VIII

The contracting powers declare that they will act in the spirit of friendship and cooperation with the purpose of further developing and strengthening the economic and cultural relations between them, following the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs.

ARTICLE IX

The treaty is open to other states, irrespective of their social and state regime, who may express their readiness, by means of participating in this treaty, to promote the unification and efforts of peace-loving countries to insure the peace and security of peoples. Accession to the treaty comes into force by agreement with the states participating in the treaty after the document of accession has been deposited with the Government of the Polish Republic.

ARTICLE X

The present treaty is subject to ratification, and the ratification instruments are to be deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic. The treaty comes into force the day the last ratification instrument has been handed over for deposition. The Government of the Polish People's Republic will inform the other states participating in the treaty of the deposition of each ratification instrument.

North Atlantic Treaty—Continued

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories,

including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. [signatures omitted]

ARTICLE XI

The present treaty will remain in force for 20 years. For the contracting powers who fail to hand to the Government of the Polish People's Republic a declaration renouncing the treaty one year before the expiration of this term it remains in force for the following 10 years.
(continued)

Should a system of collective security be set up in Europe and an all-European treaty on collective security concluded for this purpose, toward which the contracting powers will continue to aspire, the present treaty is to lose its force from the day on which an all-European treaty comes into force.
(continued)

Compiled in Warsaw on May 14, 1955 in one copy in the Russian, Polish, Czech, and German languages—all texts being of equal force. Affirmed copies of the treaty will be dispatched to the Governments of the Polish People's Republic and all other participants of the treaty, in witness of which those authorized have signed the present treaty and affixed their seals: [signatures omitted]

Treaty of Friendship—Continued

[No equivalent]

North Atlantic Treaty—Continued

ARTICLE 6

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

ARTICLE 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

[No direct equivalent]

APPENDIX C

MILITARY EXPENDITURES IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1958-59 AND 1963-66

	1958	1959	1 1963	1 1964	1 1965	1 1966
Announced military expenditures in current prices						
Bulgaria (million leva).....	173	163	297	280	231	240
Czechoslovakia (million crowns) ²	¹ 8,933	¹ 8,790	11,352	10,948	10,220	10,800
East Germany (million DME).....	(³)	(³)	2,700	2,800	2,900	⁴ 3,300
Hungary (million forints).....	2,080	2,410	6,610	6,150	⁵ 5,567	5,219
Poland (million zlotys).....	11,220	14,259	⁶ 20,694	21,881	23,500	25,300
Rumania (million lei).....	3,600	3,446	⁶ 4,143	⁶ 4,346	⁶ 4,700	4,800

¹ Planned expenditures, unless otherwise indicated.

² Including expenditures for public security.

³ East Germany began publishing realistic defense figures in 1962 following a reclassification of military expenditures among categories of the state budget which made the military budget more inclusive.

⁴ The figure shown is the upper limit indicated in the plan.

⁵ Actual expenditures in Hungary reportedly were 190 million forints less than the plan of 5,757 million forints.

⁶ Actual expenditures.

APPENDIX D

WARSAW PACT MEETINGS SINCE MAY 1955

Date	Place	Type	Members Represented	Level of Participation
27-28 Jan. 56	Prague	PCC	All	Chief or Deputy Chief of Government. Defense Ministers.
24 May 58	Moscow	PCC	All	Chiefs of Party and Government. Defense Ministers. Foreign Ministers.
27-28 Apr. 59	Warsaw	Foreign Ministers	All+CPR	Foreign Ministers, CPR. Deputy Foreign Minister.
4 Feb. 60	Moscow	PCC	All	Chiefs of Party and Government. Defense Ministers. Foreign Ministers.
28-29 Mar. 61	Moscow	PCC	Albania did not send Party or Government Chief.	Chiefs of Party and Government. Defense Minister. Foreign Minister. Chief or Deputy Chief for Economic Planning.
3-5 Aug. 61	Moscow	First Secretaries	Albanian First Secretary did not attend. Representatives of Asian socialist countries attended.	Chiefs of Party.
Sept. 61	Moscow	Defense Ministers	Albania probably absent.	Defense Ministers, Chiefs of General Staff.
30 Jan-1 Feb. 62	Prague	Defense Ministers	Albania probably absent.	Defense Ministers.
7 June 62	Moscow	PCC	All except Albania.	Chiefs of Party and Government.
27-28 Feb. 63	Warsaw	Defense Ministers	All except Albania.	Defense Ministers, Chiefs of Staffs.
July 63	Moscow	Heads of Party and Government.	All except Albania.	Chiefs of Party and Government.
26 July 63	Moscow	PCC	All except Albania.	Chiefs of Party and Government. Defense Minister. Foreign Minister or Deputy.
19-20 Jan. 65	Warsaw	PCC	All except Albania.	Chiefs of Party and Government. Defense Minister. Foreign Minister.

According to the articles of the Warsaw Treaty the Political Consultative Committee is obligated to meet at least twice a year and may convene as frequently as its members deem necessary. However, as the sporadic pattern of meetings indicates, the committee has never met biannually. The above table represents only those Pact meetings which have been held openly. It is probable that treaty members have met at unpublicized gatherings.

THE WARSAW PACT

33

CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ON SAFEGUARDING EUROPEAN
PEACE AND SECURITY

11-14 MAY 1955 (WARSAW)

Representatives:

ALBANIA: Mehmet Shehu, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Beqir Balluku, Minister of National Defense
Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs

BULGARIA: Vylko Chervenkov, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Petur Panchevsky, Minister of National Defense
Mincho Neichev, Minister of Foreign Affairs

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Viliam Siroky, Premier
Alexej Cepicka, Minister of National Defense
Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs

EAST GERMANY: Otto Grotewohl, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Walter Ulbricht, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers
Otto Nuschke, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers
Willi Stoph, Minister of the Interior
Heinz Hoffmann, Deputy Minister of the Interior
Lothar Bolz, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hans Reichelt, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry
Stefan Heymann, East German Ambassador to Poland

HUNGARY: Andras Hegedus, Premier
Istvan Bata, Minister of National Defense
Janos Boldoczky, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Endre Sik, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lajos Dragos, Hungarian Ambassador to Poland

POLAND: Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Konstantin Rokossovsky, Minister of National Defense
(Marshal of Poland, Marshal of the USSR and a Russian citizen)
Stanislaw Skrzyszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Marian Naszkowski, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

34

THE WARSAW PACT

Representatives:

RUMANIA:

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Emil Bodnaras, Minister of Armed Forces
Ion Tutoveanu, Chief of Staff of Armed Forces
Simion Bughici, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Grigore Preoteasa, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Marian Florea Ionescu, Rumanian Ambassador to Poland

U.S.S.R.:

Nikolay Bulganin, Chairman, Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R.
Vyacheslav Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Georgi Zhukov, Minister of Defense
Ivan Konev, Marshal of the Soviet Union
Aleksandr Puzanov, Chairman, Council of Ministers, RSFSR
Nikifor Kalchenko, Chairman, Council of Ministers, Ukrainian, SSR
Vilis Latsis, Chairman, Council of Ministers, Lithuanian, SSR
Aleksy Muurisepp, Chairman, Council of Ministers, Estonian, SSR
Valery Zorin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, U.S.S.R.
Panteleymon Ponomarenko, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to Poland

Observers:

CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: Peng Te-huai, Vice Premier of State Council; Minister of National Defense

Communique:

"thoroughly examined the changes in the international situation which have arisen as a result of the ratification of the Paris agreements providing for the creation of a new military alignment in the form of 'Western European Union' with the participation of a remilitarized Western Germany and her inclusion in the North Atlantic bloc, heightens the danger of a new war and threatens the national security of peaceable states. . . . to take necessary steps to ensure their security and safeguard peace in Europe . . . a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was concluded at the conference. . . . The Conference also adopted a decision to set up a Joint Command of the armed forces of the treaty states."

The treaty also provided for the creation of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee, on which each member state was to have equal representation.

THE WARSAW PACT
WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
FIRST MEETING
27 JANUARY 1956 (PRAGUE)

Representatives:

ALBANIA: Mehmet Shehu, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Beqir Balluku, Minister of National Defense

BULGARIA: Raiko Damianov, Deputy Chairman, Council
of Ministers
Petur Panchevsky, Minister of National De-
fense

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Alexej Cepicka, Deputy Premier; Minister
of National Defense
Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs

EAST GERMANY: Walter Ulbricht, First Deputy Chairman,
Council of Ministers
Willi Stoph, Minister of National Defense

HUNGARY: Andras Hegedus, Premier
Istvan Bata, Minister of National Defense

POLAND: Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Konstantin Rokossovsky, Minister of Na-
tional Defense

RUMANIA: Chivu Stoica, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Leontin Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces

U.S.S.R.: Vyacheslav Molotov, First Deputy Chairman,
Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R.
Georgi Zhukov, Minister of Defense

Observers:

CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: Nieh Jung-chen, Vice Chairman, National
Defense Council

Communique:

Announced that the East German army, established 18 January 1956, would be included in Pact's Unified Command. Also announced that a Permanent Commission, to deal with foreign affairs, and a Joint Secretariat, both under the Political Consultative Committee, were established with headquarters in Moscow.

A declaration on foreign affairs issued at the same time contained two new elements: 1) a demand that none of military forces in Germany be equipped with atomic weapons and 2) a call for improvement of relations, particularly between bloc countries and neighboring states, with the suggestion that pending establishment of a collective security system non-aggression pacts might be concluded between them; specifically mentioned in this connection were the U.S.S.R., Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and the Federal German Republic. Declaration also repeated several standard bloc proposals including: 1) an all-European collective security pact and establishment of a zone of limited armaments in Europe, to include the whole of Germany, and 2) reexamination of proposals

submitted in this respect by the British at the Geneva summit conference

WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
SECOND MEETING
24 MAY 1958 (MOSCOW)

Representatives:

ALBANIA: Enver Hoxha, First Secretary, Albanian Workers' Party
Mehmet Shehu, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Arifa Hasko, Chief of the General Staff of the Peoples' Army
Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs

BULGARIA: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, Bulgarian Communist Party
Anton Yugov, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Petur Panchevsky, Minister of National Defense
Karlo Lukanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Viliam Siroky, Premier
Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National Defense
Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs

EAST GERMANY: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, Socialist Unity Party
Otto Grotewohl, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Bruno Leuschner, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers
Willi Stoph, Minister of National Defense
Otto Winzer, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

HUNGARY: Janos Kadar, First Secretary Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; Minister of State
Geza Revesz, Minister of National Defense
Endre Sik, Minister of Foreign Affairs

POLAND: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, Polish United Workers' Party
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Marian Spychalski, Minister of National Defense
Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs

RUMANIA: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary, Rumanian Workers' Party
Chivu Stoica, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Emil Bodnaras, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers
Leontin Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces
Avram Bunaciu, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Representatives:

U.S.S.R.: Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Chairman, Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R.
Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Rodion Malinovsky, Minister of Defense

Observers:

CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: Ch'en Yun, Vice Premier, State Council; Vice Chairman Chinese Communist Party
Li Fu-chun, Vice Premier, State Council

Communique:

Announced that the Political Consultative Committee approved the Soviet-Rumanian proposal on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania in the "near future" and that it had also approved the "decision of the Soviet government in agreement with Hungary to reduce in 1958 the number of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary by one division." Communique also announced that "decisions were also taken on some organizational matters involved in the activity of the joint armed forces" but failed to specify what these decisions involved. Members of the Political Consultative Committee also resolved to address a proposal on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries and issued a draft proposal on this subject.

The committee members also heard a report by Marshal Ivan Konev, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact on a reduction of armed forces of the treaty countries.

CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES
AND CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC
27-28 APRIL 1959 (WARSAW)

Representatives:

ALBANIA: Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs
BULGARIA: Karlo Lukanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs
EAST GERMANY: Lothar Bolz, Minister of Foreign Affairs
HUNGARY: Janos Peter, First Deputy Foreign Minister
POLAND: Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs
RUMANIA: Avram Bunaciu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
U.S.S.R.: Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Observers:

CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: Chang Wen-tien, Vice Foreign Minister

Communique:

Communique issued at the end of the conference was notable for its moderation and stated that "prospects of alleviating international tension have markedly improved." It also announced the satisfaction of the meeting participants that "an agreement

has now been reached on convening a conference of foreign ministers and a summit conference."

In reference to the German problem the communique stated that the signing of a peace treaty "would also put an end to the occupation regime in West Berlin" and again called for "free city status" for West Berlin, which "would be guaranteed by the great powers, with the participation of the U.N. organization." It was also noted that "the conclusion of a German peace treaty and the settlement of the Berlin issue should not depend on the solution of the European security problem."

WARSAW FACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
THIRD MEETING
4 FEBRUARY 1960 (MOSCOW)

Representatives:

ALBANIA: Enver Hoxha, First Secretary, Albanian Workers' Party
Mehmet Shehu, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Beqir Balluku, Minister of National Defense
Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Nesti Nase, Albanian Ambassador to U.S.S.R.

BULGARIA: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, Bulgarian Communist Party
Anton Yugov, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Ivan Mikhailov, Minister of National Defense
Karlo Lukanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lyuben Gerasimov, Bulgarian Ambassador to U.S.S.R.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Antonin Novotny, First Secretary, Czechoslovak Communist Party
Viliam Siroky, Premier
Otakar Simunek, Deputy Premier
Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National Defense
Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Richard Dvorak, Czechoslovak Ambassador to U.S.S.R.

HUNGARY: Janos Kadar, First Secretary, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
Ferenc Munnich, Premier
Geza Revesz, Minister of National Defense
Endre Sik, Minister of Foreign Affairs

EAST GERMANY: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, Socialist Unity Party
Otto Grotewohl, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Willi Stoph, Minister of National Defense
Lothar Bolz, Minister of Foreign Affairs

THE WARSAW PACT

Representatives:

POLAND:

Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, Polish
United Workers' Party
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Marian Spychalski, Minister of National
Defense
Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Boleslaw Jaszczuk, Polish Ambassador to
U.S.S.R.

RUMANIA:

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary,
Rumanian Workers' Party
Chivu Stoica, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Leontin Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces
Avram Bunaciu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mihai Dalea, Rumanian Ambassador to
U.S.S.R.

U.S.S.R.:

Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary, Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union; Chair-
man, Council of Ministers U.S.S.R.
Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Rodion Malinovsky, Minister of National De-
fense

Observers:

CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC:

K'ang Sheng, Alternate Mem-
ber, Politburo, Chinese
Communist Party
Liu Hsiao, Member, Central
Committee Chinese Com-
munist Party; Chinese Am-
bassador to U.S.S.R.
Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, member,
Central Committee, Chi-
nese Communist Party

KOREAN PEOPLES' REPUBLIC:

Kim Il-song, Member, Pre-
sidium, Korean Labor
Party; First Vice Chairman,
Cabinet of Ministers
Pak Song-ch'ol, Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Hoe Pon Hal, Deputy Minis-
ter of National Defense
Kim Kwang-hyop, Minister
of National Defense

Observers:

MONGOLIAN PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, First Secretary, Mongolian Peoples' Revolutionary Party; Chairman, Council of Ministers

Lubsantserengiyn Tsend, Second Secretary, Central Committee, Mongolian Peoples' Revolutionary Party

Puntsagiyn Shagdarsuren, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jam'yangiyn Lhagbasuren, Minister of Peoples' Forces

VIETNAMESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: Truong Chinh, Deputy Premier; Member, Politburo, Dang Lao Dong

Communique:

Communique stated that the best ways to ensure the security of Europe and a peaceful settlement of the German problem were the conclusion of a German peace treaty, "renunciation of all ideas of revanchism and border revision and repudiation of the policy of German remilitarization and atomic armament."

This meeting of the Political Consultative Committee was short and was primarily a preparation for the then pending Paris summit conference. The section in the committee's declaration which described the "fruitful effects" of mutual relations and developing links between the "states of the socialist camp and the neutral countries of Asia and Africa" enumerated only the member states of the Warsaw Pact and made no mention of Communist China.

The communique issued at the end of this meeting was the first in the history of the Political Consultative Committee to be signed by the First Secretaries of the Communist parties of the countries concerned. Previously declarations had been signed only by prime ministers in accordance with normal international practice.

At this meeting Marshal Ivan Konev was relieved as Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact for "reasons of health." He was replaced by Marshal Andrey Grechko.

WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
FOURTH MEETING
28-29 MARCH 1961 (MOSCOW)

Representatives:

ALBANIA:

Beqir Balluku, First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers; Minister of National Defense

Koco Theodosi, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers; Chairman, State Planning Commission

Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Representatives:

BULGARIA: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, Bulgarian Communist Party
Anton Yugov, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Ivan Mikhailov, Minister of National Defense
Karlo Lukanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tseko Monov, Deputy Chairman, State Planning Committee

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Antonin Novotny, First Secretary, Czechoslovak Communist Party; President of the Republic
Viliam Siroky, Premier
Otakar Simunek, Chairman, State Planning Committee
Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National Defense
Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs

EAST GERMANY: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, Socialist Unity Party
Erich Honecker, Secretary, Central Committee, Socialist Unity Party
Heinz Hoffmann, Minister of National Defense
Lothar Bolz, Minister of Foreign Affairs

HUNGARY: Janos Kadar, First Secretary, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
Ferenc Munnich, Premier
Lajos Czinege, Minister of National Defense
Endre Sik, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ervin Javor, Deputy Chairman, State Planning Commission
Lajos Toth, Acting Chief, General Staff, Hungarian Peoples' Army

POLAND: Wladyslaw Gomulka^{*} First Secretary, Polish United Workers' Party
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Marian Spychalski, Minister of National Defense
Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Stefan Jedrychowski, Chairman, State Planning Commission

RUMANIA: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary, Rumanian Workers' Party
Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Leontin Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces
Corneliu Manescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gheorghe Gaston-Marin, Chairman, State Planning Commission

Representatives:

U.S.S.R.:

Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Chairman, Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R.
Rodion Malinovsky, Minister of Defense
Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Observers:

CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC:

Liu Hsiao, Member, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

KOREAN PEOPLES' REPUBLIC:

Kim Hwan-hop, Member, Presidium, Korean Labor Party; Minister of National Defense
Ch'oe Hwan, Deputy Minister of National Defense
Yui Tan Sik, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

MONGOLIAN PEOPLES' REPUBLIC:

Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, First Secretary Mongolian Peoples' Revolutionary Party; Chairman, Council of Ministers
Jam'yangiyn Lhagbarsuren, Minister of Peoples' Forces
Puntsagiyn Shagdarsuren, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Communique:

Again the communique emphasized the necessity for a German peace treaty and the making of West Berlin a demilitarized free city. On the development of international events it stated that the Political Consultative Committee "was guided by the theoretical and political conclusions of the November 1960 Conference of the Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties and by its historic documents." The statement also announced that West Germany was becoming the chief center of war danger in Europe.

The absence of the usual joint declaration and of the Albanian Party and government leaders showed that the differences between Moscow and Peking had not been eliminated. As a compensation for this failure to achieve accord the communique issued after the meeting levied massive complaints against the Western powers.

CONSULTATION OF FIRST SECRETARIES OF THE COMMUNIST AND
WORKERS' PARTIES OF THE WARSAW PACT POWERS
3-5 AUGUST 1961 (MOSCOW)

Announcements that the meeting had been convened gave no indication of the countries, parties or representatives attending beyond the statement that "representatives of the Asian socialist countries attended as observers." Presumably the first secretaries of all the member countries of the Warsaw Pact were present, with the probable exception of the Albanians, whose rift with the Soviet Union had become increasingly visible.

Communique:

According to this document the delegates to the consultation "instructed the competent authorities to prepare the necessary foreign policy and economic measures for the conclusion of the German treaty and maintenance of its provisions including the provision affecting West Berlin as a free city."

This meeting was held from the third until the fifth of August 1961. On 13 August 1961 the Berlin wall was constructed.

MEETING OF THE DEFENSE MINISTERS OF THE WARSAW PACT POWERS
SEPTEMBER 1961 (MOSCOW)

Although there was no listing of the individuals who attended the meeting it was announced that the chiefs of the general staffs of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, as well as their defense ministers attended.

According to the announcement issued after the meeting the gathering was chaired by Marshal Andrey Grechko, Commander-in-Chief of the Pact Armed Forces. It was further announced that the participants "discussed specific questions concerning enhancement of military preparedness of the troops belonging to the joint armed forces" and that they "instructed the chiefs of the general staffs to work out practical measures toward further strengthening of the defense of the Pact states stemming from the agreement reached at the meeting."

MEETING OF DEFENSE MINISTERS OF WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES
30 JANUARY-1 FEBRUARY 1962 (PRAGUE)

Again press announcements of the meeting did not list the specific countries or representatives attending and it is probable the Albanian defense minister was not present at this gathering.

According to bloc press announcements the defense ministers discussed the strengthening of their forces. It was stated that the member governments of the Pact would be asked to confirm the discussions of the Prague meeting at the next session of the Political Consultative Committee.

In general hard information on this meeting and what was discussed at it has been scarce.

THE WARSAW PACT

WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
FIFTH MEETING
7 JUNE 1962 (MOSCOW)

Representatives:

ALBANIA: Did not attend.

BULGARIA: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, Bulgarian Communist Party
Anton Yugov, Chairman, Council of Ministers

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Antonin Novotny, First Secretary, Czechoslovak Communist Party; President of the Republic
Viliam Siroky, Premier

EAST GERMANY: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, Socialist Unity Party; Chairman, Council of State
Willi Stoph, Acting Chairman, Council of Ministers

HUNGARY: Janos Kadar, First Secretary, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; Premier

POLAND: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, Polish United Workers' Party
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of Ministers

RUMANIA: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary, Rumanian Workers' Party
Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman, Council of Ministers

U.S.S.R.: Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Chairman, Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R.

Observers:

CHINESE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC: According to some reports the Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union attended.

Communique:

The communique stated that "the Warsaw Pact states declare that, just as in the past, they support the solution of problems dividing states by peaceful means, by negotiation, and they hope that the Western powers, too, will display such a sober approach to the solution of these problems."

According to the communique the delegates also reaffirmed that "a German peace settlement through conclusion of a peace treaty, abolition of the occupation regime in West Berlin on this basis and establishment of a free city of West Berlin is in the interest of European security and world peace."

MEETING OF DEFENSE MINISTERS OF WARSAW PACT STATES
27-28 FEBRUARY 1963 (WARSAW)

There is practically no information available concerning this meeting. According to very sketchy bloc-released press and radio accounts the pact defense ministers "discussed current questions related to the state of the armies and plans to coordinate military training in 1963." It is presumed that Albania did not attend the meeting and that the defense ministers of the other members attended as would normally be expected.

MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND FIRST SECRETARIES OF
WARSAW PACT STATES JULY 1963 (MOSCOW)

There is practically no information available concerning this meeting which immediately preceded the July 1963 meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee. Albania was not in attendance but presumably all other government chiefs and Party first secretaries of Pact member states were in attendance.

WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
SIXTH MEETING
26 JULY 1963 (MOSCOW)

Representatives:

ALBANIA:	Did not attend.
BULGARIA:	Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, Bulgarian Communist Party; Chairman, Council of Ministers Stanko Todorov, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers Dobri Dzhurov, Minister of National Defense
CZECHOSLOVAKIA:	Antonin Novotny, First Secretary, Czechoslovak Communist Party Viliam Siroky, Premier Otakar Simunek, Deputy Premier Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National Defense
EAST GERMANY:	Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, Socialist Unity Party; Chairman, Council of State Willi Stoph, First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers Erich Honecker, Secretary, Central Committee, Socialist Unity Party Heinz Hoffmann, Minister of National Defense Otto Winzer, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
HUNGARY:	Janos Kadar, First Secretary, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; Premier Lajos Czinege, Minister of National Defense Karoly Erdelyi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Representatives:

POLAND:

Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, Polish
United Workers' Party
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Zenon Kliszko, Member, Politburo Central
Committee, Polish United Workers' Party
Marian Spychalski, Minister of National De-
fense

RUMANIA:

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary,
Rumanian Workers' Party; Chairman,
Council of State
Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Emil Bodnaras, Deputy Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Leontin Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces
Corneliu Manescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ion Gaston-Marin, Chairman, State Planning
Commission

U.S.S.R.:

Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary, Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union; Chair-
man, Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R.
Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Rodion Malinovsky, Minister of Defense

Communique:

According to the communique issued after the committee meeting "questions connected with the state of the armed forces of the Pact states were reviewed." Soviet Marshal Andrey Grechko delivered a report on this subject and subsequently "appropriate decisions were adopted as a result of the review and exchange of views on these questions. The session was held in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding and agreement."

Available information on this meeting of the Political Consultative Committee is limited. Press announcements issued at the time of the gathering make no mention of attendance of Albanian representatives or of observers from the Asian socialist countries. The limited press play given to the developments of the meeting are further indication that among the fraternal countries of the Warsaw Pact all was not well.

THE WARSAW PACT

47

WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE
SEVENTH MEETING
19-20 JANUARY 1965 (WARSAW)

Representatives:

ALBANIA: Did not attend.

BULGARIA: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, Bulgarian Communist Party; Chairman, Council of Ministers
Dobri Dzhurov, Minister of National Defense
Ivan Bashev, Minister of Foreign Affairs

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Antonin Novotny, First Secretary, Czechoslovak Communist Party; President of the Republic
Jozef Lenart, Premier
Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National Defense
Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Oskar Jelen, Czechoslovak Ambassador to Poland

EAST GERMANY: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, Socialist Unity Party; Chairman, Council of State
Willi Stoph, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Hermann Axen, Candidate member, Politburo, Central Committee, Socialist Unity Party
Peter Florin, Chief, Department of International Relations, Central Committee, Socialist Unity Party
Heinz Hoffmann, Minister of National Defense
Lothar Bolz, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Otto Winzer, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Karl Mewis, East German Ambassador to Poland

HUNGARY: Janos Kadar, First Secretary, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
Lajos Czinege, Minister of National Defense
Janos Peter, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Karoly Erdelyi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ferenc Martin, Hungarian Ambassador to Poland

POLAND: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, Polish United Workers' Party
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman, Council of Ministers
Zenon Kliszko, Member, Politburo, Central Committee, Polish United Workers' Party
Marian Spychalski, Minister of National Defense
Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Representatives:

RUMANIA:

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary,
Rumanian Workers' Party; Chairman,
Council of State
Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Leontin Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces
Corneliu Manescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gheorghe Diaconescu, Rumanian Ambassador
to Poland

U.S.S.R.:

Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary, Communist
Party of the Soviet Union
Aleksey Kosygin, Chairman, Council of Min-
isters, U.S.S.R.
Rodion Malinovsky, Minister of Defense
Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Communique:

The communique issued after this session reiterated fact that the Pact was one of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, replayed the theme that territorial designs harbored by the Federal German Republic on the territory of the German Democratic Republic, Poland and other socialist states necessitated the existence of the Warsaw Pact organization and stated that the Political Consultative Committee regarded insuring the security of Europe as "an urgent demand of our time."

It further stated that the NATO Multilateral Force had the aim of perpetuating the special America-West German bloc within the North Atlantic alliance and commented that "this is the sort of deal by which the U.S. strives to insure its military-political hegemony in West Europe while the German Federal Republic gains access to nuclear arms for its consent to support the American line."

Additional remarks directed against the possible formation of a NATO Multilateral Force announced that "attempts to achieve implementation of West German revanchist demands by means of nuclear arms is fraught with the greatest danger to the German people, resulting not in reunification of Germany but in its conversion into an atomic desert."

